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cosmopolitan imagination. One sympathizes with the
author’s laudable efforts to interject contemporary discussions of globalization into what still remains, for the most
part, an insulated and Eurocentric field of Anglo-American
“political theory.” Yet this reviewer finds the claim of globalization theory’s philosophical and normative thinness
rather overstated. Fortunately, Robertson is not the only
global studies scholar who has grappled with the subjective dimensions of globalization. To name but a few others: David Harvey, Robert Cox, James Mittelman, Mark
Rupert, Benjamin Barber, Timothy Luke, Michael Veseth,
Leslie Sklair, Jan Aart Scholte, and this reviewer have long
explored the ideological dimensions of globalization.
Thinkers such as Jeffrey Alexander, Nestor Garcia Canclini, Dennis Altman, John Dryzek, George Yudice, Valentine Moghadam, Alison Brysk, Michael J. Shapiro,
Roland Bleiker, Spike Peterson, Raewyn Connell, and Cynthia Enloe have investigated normative dimensions of globalization related to art, identity, gender, violence, race,
aesthetics, human rights, global democracy, North–South
relations, global climate change, multiculturalism, civil society, and militarism. Scholars such as Amartya Sen, Toni
Erskine, James Rosenau, Stephen Bronner, Paul W. James,
and Amy Chua have explicitly addressed the impact of
globalization on the production of cosmopolitan forms of
consciousness. And this list of normatively inclined globalization scholars goes on. Naturally, one would not expect
Delanty to reference, much less discuss, all of these authors,
but it is puzzling not to find a single one of these names in
the bibliography of his book.
The good news is that globalization theorists have actually made a richer normative contribution than Delanty
would have us believe, which does not detract from his
larger point that subjective dimensions of globalization
“in here” have not received the same attention in the pertinent literature as objective aspects “out there.” Hence, in
spite of overstating both the poverty of globalization theory
and the novelty of his theoretical initiative, he is quite
right to link his case for a “cosmopolitan imagination” to
the argument that the subjective dimension of globalization is an important area of research in its own right. This
intellectual imperative lends his call for a cosmopolitan
imagination much of its urgency.
Drawing on the work of German social theorists—
above all Ulrich Beck—Delanty places with much care
and skill at the core of his cosmopolitan analysis the idea
of “immanent transcendence,” derived from the HegelianMarxist philosophical legacy (p. 251). Grounded in the
analysis of concretely existing problems that provide the
immanent terms of social transformation, the author links
his cosmopolitan vision to an investigation of the transformative potential of social agents’ moral and political
self-understanding as they face today’s global challenges.
For Delanty, such critical cosmopolitanism allows social
and political theorists to engage with globalization. It helps

to combat the lingering methodological nationalism in
the social sciences; to expose the Eurocentric biases remaining in much of history and philosophy; to draw attention
to the interaction of global forces with local contexts in
concrete settings of everyday life; to foster critical thinking that traverses national boundaries while at the same
time challenging the market-centered paradigm of neoliberal globalism; to recognize cultural difference as both a
reality and a positive ideal for social policy; to allow for
creative reinventions of multiple forms of political community around a global ethics; and to encourage mutual
criticism and self-problematization within the safe context of respectful and appreciative cross-cultural dialogues
(pp. 6–7). And it is precisely in the difficult task of putting the empirical flesh of local concreteness onto the normative skeleton of the global imaginary that Delanty’s
study most excels.
Fifty years ago, C. Wright Mills managed to unsettle
the rather complacent Anglo-American social science establishment by daring to suggest that the field had become
politically irrelevant and morally compromised. Most scholars, he argued, had either sought refuge in the quietude of
abstract theory or fallen into the pit of toothless empiricism. Both options had brought them ample professional
rewards but scarcely advanced knowledge of how to
improve modern society. Guided by a broad humanistic
vision, Mills called for a “new sociological imagination”
capable of identifying and understanding the most serious
social problems plaguing industrial society at midcentury—
with the intention of helping to advance the cause of social
justice. Following in his large intellectual footsteps, Delanty’s The Cosmopolitan Imagination represents a welcome
addition to social and political theory concerned with
addressing the intertwined problems of our globalizing
world.
Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and
International Theory. By Patrick Hayden. New York: Routledge,
2009. 149p. $140.00.
Between War and Politics: International Relations
and the Thought of Hannah Arendt. By Patricia Owens.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 232p. $60.00 cloth, $37.95
paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592710001611

— Ben Berger, Swarthmore College

Hannah Arendt cared about facts, and so should we. In
the Epilogue to her Origins of Totalitarianism (1979),
Arendt wrote that “freedom as well as survival may well
depend on our success or failure to persuade the other
part of the world [the Soviet bloc] to recognize facts as
they are and to come to terms with the factuality of
the world as it is” (p. 492). Theories of politics based on
misapprehensions fare no better than castles built on sand.
Nonetheless, Arendt larded her own political observations
September 2010 | Vol. 8/No. 3 937

䡬

䡬

|

|
䡬

Book Reviews

䡬

|

Political Theory

with more than her share of insupportably broad generalizations and falsifiable empirical claims, as David Cesarani and Sheri Bernam have argued. How should we deal
with them? For those of us who admire Arendt, even her
missteps can prove fruitful; even they (or perhaps especially they) prompt us to “think what we are doing” as
scholars, citizens, and moral agents. Wrestling with her
apparent misstatements—thinking “with Arendt against
Arendt” (Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought,” Political Theory
16 [February 1988]: 31)—makes for fruitful political
theory. Thundering against them, as a number of scholars
such as Bernard Wasserstein recently have done, makes for
a one-sided conversation. But ignoring them makes for its
own kind of trouble.
Patricia Owens’s Between War and Politics comprises a
gift to Arendt scholars not only because it sheds new light
on Arendt’s works—especially her often overlooked treatments of violence and war—but also because Owens
approaches those works with critical distance. She counsels that “in recognizing Arendt’s contribution to thinking
about politics and war we need not accept every idea she
expressed” (p. 6), and looks to Arendt’s observations as “a
source . . . of guidance not in what to think but how to
think about politics and war today” (p. 7, stress added). In
other words, when explicating Arendt’s thoughts on violence and war, Owens invokes the letter of Arendt’s works
(and illuminates meanings that many of us may have
missed), but when analyzing present-day politics, Owens
evokes Arendt’s spirit.
Throughout her political writings, Arendt employed a
broad set of binaries: light and darkness, visibility and
invisibility, plurality and isolation, political and social,
immortality and oblivion, as this reviewer has argued elsewhere. Power and violence seem to comprise one more
pairing in her oppositional framework. Indeed, in On Violence (1970), Arendt specifies that “power and violence are
opposites” (113–14). But Owens illuminates in Arendt’s
works a much richer and subtler relationship between violence and power, war and politics, than simple binaries
could convey. Although in On Violence Arendt claims that
violence taken to extremes negates authentic, cooperative
power, she does not mean to dismiss violence from politics entirely. And while she writes eloquently of war’s mute
brutality, she also describes its occasionally enlivening,
meaningful comradeship and thrill. As Owens explains,
Arendt “repeatedly identif[ied] the essence of free political
action as taking place during times of war,” because free
political action involves “the freedom to act with others to
bring something new into the world” (p. 31). Owens’s
main points are to establish, against poststructuralists, that
Arendt can distinguish meaningfully between politics and
war (pp. 20–32); to argue against neoconservatives that
political ends cannot justify “noble” lies—including lies
about the necessity of war in Iraq—because “the denial of

political facts . . . is destructive of the public culture necessary for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ to make sense at all”
(p. 127); and to argue, against Jürgen Habermas, that a
“global public sphere” would threaten our established
“spaces of freedom” and could inappropriately sanction
“humanitarian” violence (pp. 128–48).
While Owens initially promises “the beginnings of a
sophisticated and original political theory of war” (p. 5),
she quickly backs off—and for good reasons. As Owens
realizes, Arendt never aimed to construct a systematic theory
of politics. Owens repeats several times the aspiration for
a coherent theory, but in practice she sticks to a more
Arendtian aim: to follow “a number of theoretical ‘thoughttrains’ inspired by Arendt” in order “to assemble and critically analyse her political writing on war” (p. 7). Owens
gives us a series of related but distinct thoughts on politics
and war informed by Arendtian words and sensibilities. In
Arendtian fashion, she broadens our horizons and challenges received wisdom.
Whereas Owens urges caution against direct “application” of Arendt’s words (p. 7), Patrick Hayden’s Political
Evil in a Global Age makes application its business. On the
theoretical front, Hayden characterizes Arendt’s political
views as a form of “cosmopolitan realism”—“a critical cosmopolitanism shorn of historical and moral idealism”—an
orientation that also underpins the International Criminal Court (p. 9). But Hayden’s primary, creative argument
aims less at finding new words to describe Arendt’s politics than in finding new ways to employ her words politically. Most significantly, Hayden proposes to use Arendt’s
conception of political evil as a “tool for both critique and
change,” which is to say for political advocacy (p. 3). Justifying his endeavor, he cites Arendt’s thoughts on the
dangerous “lesser evil”: “[A]ll historical and political evidence clearly points to the more-than-intimate connection between the lesser and the greater evil. If homelessness,
rootlessness, and the disintegration of political bodies and
social classes do not directly produce totalitarianism, they
at least produce almost all of the elements that eventually
go into its formation. . . . [F]ar from protecting us against
the greater ones, the lesser evils have invariably led us into
them” (Essays in Understanding, 1994, pp. 271–72, quoted
in Hayden, p. 7).
For the rest of his book, Hayden reframes those “lesser
evils” of homelessness, rootlessness, global poverty, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as well as a surprise
addition—neoliberal globalization—as forms of Arendtian
political evil. Poverty and rootlessness often pass our peripheral vision, but the rhetoric of evil might arrest our attention and galvanize us to action.
If theorists have any tendency toward insularity, Hayden’s case studies will draw them forcefully into the present.
Indeed, theorists with a care for the political world should
aspire to know as much as possible about its problems
and promises. Arendt serves as a suitable guide, having
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beckoned us throughout her works to look inside and
outside the nation-state’s boundaries, to all corners of the
globe and occasionally beyond it: to examine political issues
that are timely as well as timeless. Hayden’s book, in addition to making a provocative political argument, offers a
useful instrument for teaching undergraduates about vital
world events and the ways in which political theory can
interpret them.
Hayden’s first several chapters frame global poverty
(pp. 32–54) and statelessness (pp. 55–92) as threats to
human plurality, and as gateways to the conditions of
“superfluity” and “disposability” that Arendt associated with
totalitarianism’s rise. Up to that point, many readers might
follow him completely. No one defends poverty or statelessness, and describing them in Arendtian terms can enrich
our understanding of the harms that they cause. But Hayden’s biggest punch, saved for last, will appeal primarily to
those who share his political commitments. Neoliberal
globalization, one sees from assembling the previous chapters’ claims, has been causally associated with the conditions of poverty, rootlessness, and disintegration of political
bodies and social classes. Thus, if Arendt once called those
conditions “lesser evils” that “invariably” lead to greater
ones such as totalitarianism, then neoliberal globalization
must be called politically evil by association. Its one, specific evil is “to depoliticize human affairs as such, to render
the worldly spaces between people apolitical and devoid
of care” (p. 93). Neoliberalism’s proponents and agents
might lack evil intentions, but so did Adolf Eichmann’s
thoughtless facilitation of evil (according to Arendt).
While bold and arresting, Hayden’s arguments struggle
on several fronts and could have benefited immeasurably
from a willingness to think critically about some of Arendt’s
assertions. For example, her causal claim about “lesser evils”
might not be true. Have the lesser evils of rootlessness,
homelessness, and the breakdown of social and political
classes really “invariably” led us into totalitarianism? Perhaps so, except in the myriad instances when they have
not. And even that formulation might be too generous,
because Arendt does not actually demonstrate in any systematic or conclusive way that the so-called lesser evils led
to Hitler’s or Stalin’s totalitarianism in the first place. In
effect, Hayden presents as a systematic theory what Arendt
offered only as a sweeping generalization and a broad warning. As a broad warning, it remains cogent and timely; we
should guard against any conditions that inflict gross harm
and marginalize political voice. As systematic theory, it
founders on the shoals of what Arendt in Between Past and
Future (1961) calls “demonstrable fact” (p. 149).
Further, Hayden’s aspiration to use the label of evil as a
“tool for critique and change” contrasts with Arendt’s spirit
of nuance and complexity. In the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt berates postwar Soviet communism for suffocating the political realm, plural discourse, and the grounds
of common sense, a situation made world-shatteringly dan-

gerous because of nuclear capabilities. Nonetheless, she
refrains from labeling Soviet communism (or Western capitalism) evil. Why, then, would one use an Arendtian framework to label neoliberal globalization evil, when its
proponents or its agents have nowhere near the Soviets’
ambition or ability to eliminate free spaces and crush dissent? And why would one simultaneously omit to mention, as Hayden does, those forces that undeniably do aim
to quash plural discussion and diversity among equals,
such as Al Qaeda, North Korea, or Iran? Must we run so
far from anything associated with the Bush or Blair administrations that we intentionally overlook any sources of
danger that those politicians dared to flag? “The enemy of
my enemy gets a free pass” should not be a maxim by
which political theorists or political scientists take their
bearings.
In one additional area, not only Hayden but Owens
might have profited by challenging Arendt’s claims, rather
than accepting them at face value. Both authors oppose
humanitarian wars fought in the name of human rights,
and they anchor their opposition in Arendt’s elevation of
plurality. We can and should fight genocide, both authors
agree, not primarily because of the human suffering or
mass murder or mass cruelty inflicted but because genocide denies the human condition of plurality (Hayden,
p. 14; Owens, p. 109). Although this rationale might puzzle readers from across the political spectrum, Owens and
Hayden share their ground with Arendt.
Arendt wrote of Eichmann that “the real reason, and
the only reason, you must hang” was not the fact of mass
murder or gross cruelty but denial of plurality: “[J]ust as
you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to
share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of
a number of other nations . . . this is the reason, and the
only reason, you must hang” (Eichmann in Jerusalem,
1963, p. 279). But just because Arendt elevated the nebulous concept of plurality above the concrete harms of
torture, cruelty, and death, we might and must ask: What
makes that claim true? After all, alongside plurality, Arendt
also elevated light and visibility, which led to her bald
assertions that “darkness rather than want is the curse of
poverty” and that “the tragedy of savage tribes is that
they live and die without leaving any trace” (On Revolution, 1990, p. 69; Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 296). The
murdered, the poor, and the “savages” might have something to say about those stylized pronouncements. The
point here is not that we should discard Arendt; the
point is that even if we appreciate her brilliant and visionary insights, we can question her foundations before building on top of them.
The many virtues of the interpretive projects of Patricia
Owens and Patrick Hayden far outweigh any of the criticisms offered here. Both books will engage and educate
Arendt scholars, political theorists more generally, and students of world politics. Owens breaks new ground on
September 2010 | Vol. 8/No. 3 939
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Arendt and war, making valuable contributions to existing Arendt scholarship; Hayden employs an extremely
clever and creative, if contentious, strategy for employing
Arendt practically.
Beyond their obvious appeal to political theorists and
Arendt specialists, both books also aim to interest international relations scholars in her work and words. Through
no particular fault of the authors, that audience may prove
substantially more difficult to reach. At least in the United
States (perhaps to a lesser degree in the UK and elsewhere), quantitative analysis has assumed the leading role
in international relations studies. Even many qualitatively
oriented scholars do not usually engage with the type of
specialized vocabulary and nonsystematic reflection that
Arendt offers. One can guess that if mainstream IR scholars were to employ Arendt’s works at all, their purpose
would be to pick a quote or phrase here or there to bolster
one of their existing commitments. Nonetheless, in one
respect Arendt could prove valuable to scholars of international relations (and political scientists generally) on
their own terms. Instead of looking to her for a complete
theory of politics or for a pronouncement on events that
occurred after her death, political scientists could view her
works as a rich source of testable hypotheses from one of
the twentieth century’s most fertile minds. As Owens mentions, Arendt felt that “the likelihood of violence increases
when those we usually understand as ‘holding’ power ‘feel
it slipping from their hands’” (Crises of the Republic, 1972,
quoted in Owens, p. 16). Is Arendt right? Amass evidence
systematically and test the hypothesis. For a second example, Arendt asserted that superfluousness and statelessness
contributed to totalitarianism’s rise. One might define those
terms consistently and then examine the relevant (historical and current) evidence.
Some of Arendt’s claims will undoubtedly stand up to
scrutiny; others will prove misguided or misleading. Regardless, in addition to appreciating Arendt’s thoughts for their
own sake, scholars have much to gain by taking her seriously and testing her original and provocative insights—
challenging, as she too did, our own assumptions and
prejudices for the sake of understanding our common world.
Freud’s Foes: Psychoanalysis, Science and
Resistance. By Kurt Jacobsen. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2009. 196p. $59.95.
doi:10.1017/S1537592710001623

— Eli Zaretsky, New School for Social Research

The transformation of psychoanalysis from one of the core
emancipatory doctrines of twentieth-century modernism
into a reviled, reactionary “pseudoscience” is certainly one
of the signal events of recent cultural history. Kurt Jacobsen’s book traces one important aspect of this transformation: American psychiatry’s successful onslaught against
its erstwhile Freudian master. A volume in “Polemics,” the

lively new series of short, disputatious books edited by
Stephen Eric Bronner for the now-legendary “general
reader,” Freud’s Foes is important, accurate, and informative. In a brief compass, it lays bare the tenacious and
pullulating power of supposedly neutral or objective “outcome studies” to overtake and consume a matter as close
to a culture’s core needs as the study of the human mind.
Its special contribution lies in explicating and critiquing
the illusions that underlie the current faith in pharmacology, high-tech solutions, brain research, and other wonders. Jacobsen’s story raises broad, general questions
concerning the place of science in society, as well as the
need to restore the line not so much between science and
falsehood as between the kinds of questions that can be
answered in a causal and deterministic manner, and the
kind that require self-reflection, democratic deliberation
and cultural exploration.
In order to more fully address these questions, it is
helpful to begin with a definition of psychoanalysis itself,
something Jacobsen fails to do. Psychoanalysis was an intervention in the long-standing modern project of understanding the nature of the human mind. Its predecessors
did include nineteenth-century brain neurologists like some
of Freud’s mentors, Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke, Theodor
Meynert and Jean-Martin Charcot. But it also encompassed Enlightenment philosophy, especially Kant’s conception of the human subject; literature, including theatre,
with all of its explorations of motivation and character;
Darwin’s extraordinary work, which described the evolution of the mind as well as the brain; and even forms of
folk knowledge, such as those linked to hypnotism, which
lay at the basis of popular healing. The result was not an
amalgam but a genuinely new, unified, and brilliant theory.
This theory was scientific—a new science—but a science
of a particular character, one that studied the mind not as
one studies chemical or geological phenomena, that is from
the outside, but rather from within, as part of a process of
self-study. As readers of Perspectives on Politics will understand, then, psychoanalysis was a critical theory, a Wissenschaft, and not a natural science per se, although it contained
natural science elements.
Psychiatry, Jacobsen’s main concern, was only a small
part of psychoanalysis. Indeed, one of the great advantages of the psychoanalytic worldview lay in the way in
which it problematized the psychotherapeutic model, and
especially the medical as well as moral/religious assumptions that so often infused it. It is also true, however, that
psychoanalysis, especially in the United States, became
part of psychiatry, and in that way became part of an
official system of power/knowledge, losing its critical
dimensions. Jacobsen fails to describe the power wielded
by American psychoanalytic psychiatrists in the 1950s,
1960s and 1970s, their sexism, their prejudices concerning gays, their ignorance even of their own history,
and their overweening sense of self-importance. This
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